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ABSTRACT: Most of scholars have typically regarded Confucius as an ethical thinker 
broadly construed and not as an epistemological thinker. This paper seeks to overturn that 
view and, in doing so, has three basic goals. The first goal is to make the case that Confucian 
thought of the Analects is of epistemological significance. Goal two is to locate the 
significance of the Confucian thought within epistemology while accounting for the past 
overlooking of this significance. The third goal is to show that the Confucian thought is not 
only of epistemological significance, but that it can make a contribution to progressing 
contemporary epistemology. 
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Apt belief, animal knowledge, is better than belief that succeeds in its aim, being true, 
without being apt. Apt belief aptly noted, reflective knowledge, is better than mere apt 
belief or animal knowledge, especially when the reflective knowledge helps to guide the 
first order belief so that it is apt. In such a case the belief is fully apt, and the subject 
knows full well. (Ernest Sosa 2011, 12-13) 
 
The Master said, “When you know, to know (recognize) that you know; and when you do 
not know, to know (recognize) that you do not know; that is knowledge.” (Analects 2.17)1 
 
1. CONFUCIUS’ THOUGHT IS OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
 
While the Confucius of the Analects has been regarded as providing a virtue-based 
approach in ethics, he is not commonly noted as providing anything of 
epistemological significance. (Yao, 2000: 33). In this paper I will argue that the 
Confucian thought of the Analects is of epistemological significance, in particular for 
virtue epistemology. In this section, I am simply making the case that particular 
epistemological stances are taken in the Analects that are not merely commonsensical 
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or obvious. Yet, in the context of the vast literature on Confucius, my claim is a bold 
one. I am making a claim that runs counter to much ancient and contemporary 
treatment of Confucius. In this section I will defend this claim. I had better also 
account for why Confucius has not been seen as making a contribution to 
epistemology. My focus shifts to this task in the next section.            
  Confucius is undoubtedly concerned with moral issues. In fact, on some 
interpretations of the Analects, morality is the main concern. Jeffrey Riegel (2013), in 
the Stanford Encycloedia of Philosophy, suggests just such an interpretation. He 
writes that the Confucius of the Analects appears most concerned with moral matters. 
In fact, because of the central place of virtues in Confucian thought, virtues such as 
ren (universal benevolence), and Confucius' discussion of such virtue in relation to 
the junzi, an exemplar of the virtuous person, Confucius is naturally seen as doing 
virtue ethics.2 To be clear, I am not saying that those who see Confucius as making a 
contribution to moral thought are mistaken. However, it would obviously be a 
mistake to see Confucius as only having such a concern. Just like Aristotle, Confucius 
is clearly concerned with what it is to be an exemplary person or good agent in a 
much broader sense than a solely moral sense. For example, the inherent partiality of 
xiao, translated as 'filial piety', is not obviously a moral virtue, though it is a virtue 
discussed by Confucius: depending on whether morality is best seen as necessarily 
requiring impartiality, it may be best to see xiao as a filial virtue (or an ethical virtue) 
but not a moral virtue per se. In other words, on this view, xiao is a non-moral virtue, 
which nevertheless the exemplary person possesses. This provides one basis for 
thinking that it is a mistake to see Confucius as only being concerned with morality. 
This claim, however, does not rest on that. 
 Confucius also lists zhi, wisdom, as a virtue. In fact, it is listed in the Analects as 
one of three virtues that lead the way to becoming a jun-zi: "The wise (zhi) are free 
from perplexities; the virtuous [actually ren] from anxiety; and the bold from fear". 
(Analects 9.29, discussed in Mi 2015, 365). Zhi is, therefore, a significant virtue in 
Confucian thought and an intellectual virtue at that.              
 A concern for what it is to be a good agent in a sense that is not reducible to the 
moral is still within the domain of ethics. This is surely right in that the notion of 
good agent is used in ethics not necessarily just to refer to the moral agent but rather 
to the agent who lives well. We can categorize discourse on how to live well or 
theories of the good life as ethics without taking either to necessarily be reducible to 
moral theory. Confucius is, in fact, concerned with how to live well. 
 As with Aristotle, part of this living well in Confucian thought is constituted by an 
epistemic component, of which there is detailed discussion. Confucius, unlike 
Aristotle however, did not leave us any writings through which we could discover his 
ideas. Rather, like Socrates, we learn about Confucius' ideas through records kept by 
                                                
2 Early translations of the Analects rendered jun-zi as ‘gentleman’, though a more recent and perhaps 
more apt translation from Ames and Rosemont (1998) translates jun-zi as ‘exemplary person’. (Wong 
2013).  
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his students. The record kept of Confucius' ideas was a series of short descriptions of 
situations and what Confucius said in those situations. The form in which we have 
Confucius' ideas is not such as to lend itself to comprehensive unambiguous accounts 
of theoretical positions; interpretations of Confucian thought are required.  
 For this reason, I am not making the case that Confucius is a virtue epistemologist, 
though, given the sophistication of his thought as evidenced in the Analects, I am not 
saying he is not either. This is why in this section I defend the more restricted claim 
mentioned earlier—that some of what Confucius said, as recorded in the Analects, 
was of epistemological significance, particularly of virtue epistemological 
significance.  
 Let us now turn to Confucian thought that is of epistemological significance. The 
view that there is nothing of epistemological significance in the Confucian thought of 
the Analects overlooks the fact that Confucius in the Analects, does have things to say 
about epistemological matters. It is true, however, that Confucius does not approach 
epistemological matters the way epistemologists in the modern era have tended to do 
so. Confucius shows his concern for epistemological matters within an agent-based 
approach. This is just the same way that he shows concern for moral matters. This 
agent-based approach in Confucian thought is in keeping with the agent-based 
approach of virtue epistemology more generally. 
 For example, according to Confucius, the exemplary person, in order for that 
person to be exemplary, must carefully scrutinize what we would today call first-
order beliefs. If we want to have the epistemic status characteristic of the superior 
man, then those first-order beliefs must be subject to appropriate reflection. This idea 
is developed by distinction between two sorts of knowledge, shi (識) and zhi (知) in 
the Analects. I (2015) have discussed this distinction in more detail and highlighted 
the parallel with Sosa's distinction between animal and reflective knowledge.3 Shi, 
which usually stands for “recognizing” or “memorizing” in Chinese, can be 
understood as first-order knowledge, or information acquired. Zhi, on the other hand, 
is second-order and is ascended to when first-order knowledge has been subject to the 
right sort of reflection and thereby undergoes development. It is in the following 
passage knowledge (zhi) is characterized as reflective knowledge: 
 
The Master said, “When you know, to know (recognize) that you know; and when you do 
not know, to know (recognize) that you do not know; that is knowledge.” (Analects 
2.17).4  
 
In the passage quoted below, there is also a description that indicates the significance 
of the zhi and shi distinction for the exemplary person and, from the second sentence, 
a characterisation of shi:         
The Master said, “There may be those who act without knowing why. I did not do 
                                                
3 Mi (2015) highlights that sources of shi are the senses and memory. Such knowledge allows us to 
recognize, identify, differentiate, and simply to know certain things. As Mi points out, however, 
Confucius is not very much concerned with first-order knowledge.  
4 For further discussion of the epistemological significance of this passage, see Sosa (2015).   
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so. Hearing much and selecting what is good and following it; seeing much and 
keeping it in memory—this is the second style of knowledge [or a lower level of 
knowledge].” (Analects 7.28). 
 
What is important to note here is that Confucius, an exemplar too, indicates that zhi is 
required for action, not merely shi. He does so by saying that he does not act without 
zhi. In fact, aside from getting a distinction between two different sorts of knowledge, 
we also get an indication as to why epistemological matters are significant for moral 
matters. The virtuous person should have the right sort of knowledge, reflective 
knowledge, before acting. From these passages, fragmentary though they are, we can 
see that Confucius’ thought is of epistemological significance. In what follows, I will 
explore the significance of that thought in greater depth. 
 
2.  LOCATING THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE  
OF CONFUCIAN THOUGHT5 
 
Within traditional Chinese scholarship there was not an epistemology on the modern 
Western model, or, to simplify, a science of knowledge. There was no isolated study 
of knowledge abstracted from daily concerns. It is therefore unsurprising that Chinese 
scholars did not categorize Confucian thought as making a contribution to 
epistemology as well as ethics.  
 In Western scholarship, certainly since Western scholars first came into contact 
with Confucian thought and up until very recently, a strongly contrasting practice 
hold sway. Knowledge and related theoretical issues, such as skepticism and 
justification, have been studied in isolation from what it is to be a good agent. In fact, 
for this reason, it is understandable that the epistemological significance of Confucian 
thought has been overlooked. Confucian thought could not be seen as being of 
epistemological significance by Western scholars, when that thought looked so unlike 
epistemology as practiced by Western scholars.  
 So what is changed? In recent years, epistemology in the West has undergone a 
significant shift. There has been “a virtue turn”.6 (Mi, Slote, and Sosa 2015). This has 
meant that in much epistemology there has been a move away from the examination 
of epistemic issues in isolation from one another to a theoretically unified agent-based 
examination of epistemological issues. 
 As mentioned, this agent-based approach in epistemology, marks a new trend in 
the field. The virtue turn has been a welcome response to the blockages and sclerosis 
                                                
5 To be sure, there is a long Confucian tradition from the classical Confucianism, Song-Ming Neo-
Confucianism, all the way up to the contemporary Neo-Confucianism. However, the Confucian 
thought I am focusing on here is mainly the Confucian thought of the Analects in the first three 
sections, and moves on to the Confucian thought of The Great Learning in Section 4. Instead of doing 
the scholarly interpretation work on the Confucian thought, I opt for doing philosophical work and 
setting up the philosophical problematics plus their solutions.  
6  Actually, this can also be described as a virtue return, as it marks epistemology's return to the 
approach of Aristotle and Plato. (Mi, Slote, and Sosa 2015).  
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that epistemology faced. The lack of a plausible theoretically unifying approach in 
epistemology, and the lack of such an approach that was agent-based in particular, 
have meant that there was an apparent undue, to many outside of the fielding, 
perplexing focus on one particular sort of cases—Gettier cases; an inability to provide 
a convincing account of a core, perhaps the core, concept of epistemology— 
justification; and a failure of the narrow, theoretically ununified approach to produce 
theoretical consistency across areas of specialization—the value problem.  
 The virtue turn has led to dialectical progress across all of these areas, though, 
unsurprisingly, in none of these areas has the matter become settled. Virtue theorists 
such as Sosa (2007) and Greco (2010) have offered robust virtue epistemological 
solutions to Gettier cases, while Pritichard (2010) has offered an anti-luck virtue 
epistemological solution.7 It should be noted that other virtue epistemologists have 
regarded the decades long concern with the problem as mistaken and have developed 
new areas of epistemology which are unconcerned with the analysis of knowledge 
and solving the Gettier problem. (Baehr 2008).  
 Arguably the virtue turn was initiated by Sosa’s (1980) paper in response to the 
problem of epistemic justification mentioned above. It was his pioneering work, “The 
Raft and the Pyramid”, which introduced a virtue epistemological approach as a 
solution to a mainstream epistemological problem. In the paper Sosa argues that both 
foundationalist and coherentist accounts of justification suffer from fatal flaws but 
that a virtue theoretic account can take the best from each approach while avoiding 
the fatal flaws of each.  
 Linda Zagzebski (2003), a pre-eminent virtue theorist makes the case that a 
widely supported account of epistemic justification—reliabilism, an account of 
justification claimed by its proponents as necessary for knowledge, creates difficulties 
in accounting for the value of knowledge. Plausibly, a good theory of knowledge will 
not only be informative with regard to the nature of knowledge, but a good theory of 
knowledge will also allow us to account for the value of knowledge—in particular, 
the superior value of knowledge vis-a-vis mere true belief. The swamping problem 
that Zagzebski identifies for reliabilists is addressed by leading virtue theorists such 
as Greco (2011, 2010, 2009). Greco’s agent reliabilist response is to defend the claim 
that knowledge is a kind of achievement, an achievement being a success from ability, 
and that achievements have value that mere true beliefs lack.  
 The virtue turn in epistemology with its agent-based approach enables Western 
scholars who examine Confucian thought to see its epistemological significance. In 
fact, engagement by Western scholars with Confucian thought as virtue 
epistemological has been almost non-existent up until now. Nonetheless, Sosa (2015), 
a leading virtue epistemologist, does engage with an epistemological aspect of 
Confucian thought. I have also worked on this matter for years, and make a further 
effort and development here in this paper.  
 
                                                
7 Pritchard (2010, 24) defines robust virtue epistemology as theories of the nature of knowledge that 
account for knowledge exclusively on the basis of virtue and don't retain a separate anti-luck condition.  
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3. CONFUCIAN THOUGHT – PROGRESSING THE DEBATE 
 
Having made the case that Confucian thought is of epistemological significance, in 
particular of virtue epistemological significance, I now turn to making the case that 
Confucian thought can contribute to progressing contemporary virtue epistemological 
discourse.  
 The recordings of Confucius’ sayings are indicative of well-thought out positions, 
which chime with positions in contemporary debates in a number of areas of 
philosophy. In fact, in my own virtue epistemological work, I have drawn on some 
Confucian thought. The distinction in the Analects between different types of 
knowledge is just one example.   
 There are, however, areas in Confucian thought, even with regard to the good 
intellectual agent, which are unique and are worthy of further examination. Confucius, 
for example, gives special place to reflection in what he has to say about the good 
epistemic agent. While several philosophers in the contemporary literature are 
developing positions with regard to reflection (see Kornblith 2012; Kvanvig 2014), 
Confucius offers innovations in this area. These ideas are not merely of 
epistemological significance, but have the potential to progress virtue epistemological 
discourse. To see where Confucian thought can help progressing the virtue 
epistemological discourse, it's important to provide some background to that 
discourse.  
 An interest in the epistemological significance of reflection has been growing in 
contemporary epistemological discourse. On the one hand, we can find a challenge to 
its epistemological significance posed by Hiliary Kornblith (2012) and, on the other 
hand, Sosa (2014, 2011) has also been advocating its epistemological significance.8 
 As I have discussed, Kornblith (2012, 1) charges philosophers with having a 
mistaken view of the nature of reflection and its potential as a capacity. For example, 
philosophers’ views of reflection, according to Kornblith, conflict with an empirically 
informed view according to which reflection is not capable of bringing about 
philosophical progress. In fact, he claims that many of the processes involved in 
reflection are “terribly unreliable”. (Kornblith 2012, 1). In supports of his position, 
Kornblith (2012, 23) cites various studies purporting to show that belief formation is 
unduly affected by colours, anchoring effects, and so on.9  
 Kornblith's charge poses a challenge to Sosa’s (2014) theory of knowledge, which 
accords a special place for reflection. Sosa (2014, 13) conceives of reflection as being 
“something directed or turned on itself” or “meditation, or careful thought”. As 
discussed, Sosa distinguishes animal knowledge from reflective knowledge. The 
former is a brute knowing, while the latter is a meta-competent knowing.  
 Sosa (2011, 1-13) articulates this through his AAA (Accuracy, Adroitness, and 
Aptness) model, which treats belief as a kind of performance. According to the AAA 
model performances have three aspects by which they can be assessed. These three 
                                                
8 See Mi and Ryan (2015) for examination of these two positions. 
9 For further discussion of Kornblith on reflection, see Mi and Ryan (2015).  
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aspects of performance are accuracy, adroitness, and aptness. Knowledge is a case of 
a well performing belief and, as such, each of the three aspects are present in cases of 
knowledge. In cases of knowledge, belief is accurate and so true, belief is adroit and 
manifests competence, and a belief is apt—it is true because competent. Sosa calls 
such well performing belief animal knowledge. Simply speaking, knowledge for Sosa 
is simply an apt belief. 
 Reflective knowledge is a meta-competent knowing. It is a type of knowledge that 
goes beyond animal knowledge. Sosa defines meta-competent knowledge as apt 
belief aptly noted. Such belief also follows the AAA model of performance, though 
the well performing belief of meta-competent knowledge is an order higher than apt 
belief, requiring as it does belief. Such meta-competent knowing is belief recognized 
as apt because of competence. For Sosa, this meta-competence is a reflective 
competence. If, however, Kornblith is right that the processes involved in reflection 
are 'terribly unreliable', then it is hard to see how reflection could qualify as a 
competence and, in turn, how we can say there is such thing as reflective knowledge, 
at least the sort of reflective knowledge that Sosa has in mind. If Kornblith is right 
that philosophers don't understand the nature of reflection, then the task facing the 
defender of reflective knowledge looks daunting.  
 In my own work, I attempt to answer that challenge and a crucial part in doing so 
is informed by Confucian thought. In Confucian thought, it is the jun-zi, the virtuous 
or exemplary person, who is properly reflective. This inspires the move to 
differentiate between skillful reflection or virtuous reflection from unskillful 
reflection or unvirtuous reflection, which in any case is a plausible distinction that 
bears on the empirical data that Kornblith offers in support of his position that 
reflection is 'terribly unreliable'.  
 My next step is to elaborate on the nature of reflection. Again, Confucian thought 
shapes the account I have been setting out. While part of what I say about the nature 
of reflection, and skillful reflection, draws on dual-process theory in psychology and 
cognitive science, another part draws on what is said about reflection in the Analects.       
 In the Analects there is a distinction between two sorts of reflection. The 
exemplary person's has a reflective capacity with two key components. There is a 
perspective component and a retrospective component in the exemplary person's 
reflective capacity and dispositional responses. This perspective component involves 
perception and reasoning, which are directed at a certain goal or good.10 In other 
words, reflection that takes place draws on these capacities and does so with a 
particular goal or goals in mind. The perspective component of reflection disposes the 
virtuous agent to carefully look ahead when appropriate.  
 The retrospective component, on the other hand, utilizes memories and trained 
responses. In this case, these responses aren't directed at reaching certain goals but at 
moving away from or avoiding their opposites. The retrospective component of 
reflection disposes the exemplary agent to carefully draw on learning from past 
mistakes when appropriate.  
                                                
10 The exemplary agent will have goods or appropriate ends as their goals.  
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 The Chinese ‘省’ is used for the retrospective component, while ‘思’ is used for 
the perspective component, as we can see from the Analects: 
 
The philosopher Zeng said, “I daily reflect (省) on myself with regard to three points: 
whether, in transacting business for others, I may have been not faithful; whether, in 
intercourse with friends, I may have been not sincere; whether I may have not 
mastered and practiced the instructions of my teacher.” (Analects 1.4).  
 
The Master said, “When we see men of worth, we should think (思) of equaling them; 
when we see men of a contrary character, we should turn inwards and reflect (省) on 
ourselves.” (Analects 4.17). 
 
Ji Wen thought (思) thrice, and then acted. When the Master was informed of it, he 
said, “Twice may do.” (Analects 5.20).11 
 
So, skillful reflection has the model like a dual-sided mirror: On the one hand, 
perspective reflection as thinking forward (or “思”), let us call it forward-looking 
reflection, plays a role like a guiding light which lays out and shines through 
objective evidence, information, and models in the conscious and conscientious mind 
of the agent (who is thinking and making a choice of the right way to perform and 
endeavor to attain his aim, whatever the aim may be). On the other hand, 
retrospective reflection as thinking backward (or “省”), call it backward-looking 
reflection, plays a role like a searching alarm which retrieves and inspects beliefs, 
thoughts, and representations in the short term or long term memory of the agent 
(who is examining any wrongdoing of his or hers in the past and is seeking his or her 
best way to avoid or improve them in the future).                                                                                              
 Reflection in both directions, has a great deal to do with Confucius's conception 
of knowledge. As I have shown in my work 12 , perspective (forward-looking) 
reflection and retrospective (backward-looking) reflection can square very nicely with 
the ideas of “to know that you know” and “to know that you don't know”, both of 
which can go hand in hand and make a joint contribution to our acquisition of 
knowledge and the pursuit of the ultimate epistemic goal. 
 To understand what knowledge is and why we should want to acquire the kind of 
knowledge Confucius proposes pursuing (to his students and to human beings in 
general), the best way to proceed is to focus on the important concept of “learning” 
(“學”) and the relationship between learning and reflection. A key passage from the 
Analects of Confucius may help clarify matters here: 
 
                                                
11In these translations of the Analects ‘thinking’ is used for ‘思’. Elsewhere I make the case, following 
John Dewey (1933, 9) that reflection is characterised by 'active, persistent, and careful consideration'. 
It's clear that where ‘思’ is being used in the passages, it is described as an action with the above 
characterization, hence I think reflection is the appropriate translation.   
12 Mi (2015) emphasizes that for Confucius “to know that you know” together with “to know that you 
don’t know” will constitute what he redeems to be the best kind of knowledge (or wisdom).  
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 The Master said, “Learning without thought is labor lost; thought without learning is 
 perilous.” (Analects 2.15) 
 
We cannot emphasize enough the importance of learning in Confucius's teachings and 
in his own career. He teaches his students (at the very beginning of the list of his 
teachings in Analects) through rhetorical question that it is “pleasant (enjoyable) to 
learn with a constant perseverance and application” (Analects 1.1).13 He also vividly 
describes his own autobiographic career as follows:  
 
At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty, I stood firm. At forty, I had no 
doubts. At fifty, I knew the decrees of Heaven14. At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ 
for the reception of truth. At seventy, I could follow what my heart desired, without 
transgressing what was right. (Analects 2.4)  
 
Without learning, many desirable qualities of character or performance (moral as well 
as intellectual) will become defective. Confucius gives six examples of the flaws that 
result from supposedly good qualities when combined with a lack of effort at learning. 
Let me just mention the one which is related to our topic here: “There is the love of 
knowing without the love of learning - the beclouding here leads to dissipation of 
mind.” (Analects 17.8) The love of knowing counts as a very good virtue and one of 
the epistemic goals Confucius has set up for pursuing knowledge, but it will lead to 
an empty mind and become fruitless if one has no desire to learn.  
 When we learn, we learn to acquire knowledge, to possess knowledge, and to 
enjoy knowledge, be it common knowledge, practical knowledge, craft knowledge, 
moral knowledge, or theoretical knowledge. That is why Confucius also compares 
different degrees of dealing with the acquisition of knowledge, which we will see 
reflected in three different grades of knowledge. He says: “They who know the truth 
are not equal to those who love it, and they who love it are not equal to those who 
delight in it.”15 (Analects 6.20) Those who simply know the truth are people who can 
acquire knowledge through their basic (cognitive) functions. Those who love (not 
emotionally but intellectually) knowledge show their willingness and consciousness 
                                                
13 Some may object that the point of Analects 1.1 here is to emphasize “practice”, but not “learning”. 
However, it is quite obvious from what is being said here that Confucius emphasizes that it is pleasant 
to “learn” and to “constantly practice what is learned”. Both “learning” and “practice” make a great 
contribution to our reflective knowledge. 
14 We also need to figure out what kind of knowledge Confucius has in mind in “knowing the decrees 
of Heaven”. 
15 Two points should be noted here. We should see each comparison as marking a step on one journey 
to the highest standing. In other words, while loving the truth is superior to knowing the truth, loving 
the truth also involves knowing the truth, and while enjoying the truth is superior to loving the truth, 
enjoying the truth also involves loving the truth. The second point regards the object of each of the 
stages (the object of knowing, loving, enjoying). I interpret “之” as “truth”, though my point would 
also hold if “dao” was the interpretation. Furthermore, I am not taking truth here to refer only to 
empirical propositions. I take it also to include such truths as moral truths. I reject therefore, a purely 
intellectualist interpretation of this passage, just as I reject a purely moralist interpretation of this 
passage.      
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to employ a higher cognitive mechanism in order to grasp what they have learned and 
secure the possession of knowledge. Finally those who delight (with no doubts and no 
regrets) in knowledge possession can savor the love of knowledge and enjoy the 
highest epistemic status, that is, they can achieve comprehensive understanding.   
 The following two questions bring into focus the relevance of what has been 
discussed in the previous section. First, what role can reflection play in our overall 
learning and acquisition of knowledge? Second, what are the proper epistemic goals 
in our pursuit of knowledge? The two questions are closely related. 
 Let's first see how reflection and learning interact with each other, and further 
contribute jointly to the acquisition of knowledge. Learning, according to Confucius, 
requires the learner to frequently revisit what he has learned and to make good use of 
it. Most translations emphasize the importance of putting what you have learned to 
good use, repeated practice, and repeated application. However, if we take into 
account and consider Confucius' observation that “learning without thought is labor 
lost” (“學而不思則罔”) and his advice to “keep cherishing old knowledge, so as 
continually to be acquiring new” (“溫故而知新”, Analects 2.11), then we will not 
only see the equal importance of repeatedly revisiting and cherishing the old 
knowledge we have learned, but also realize the real point of constantly practicing 
and applying it. 
 The real point of Confucius' “learning and practice” (“學習” in Chinese) has to do 
with reflection in both directions (forward-looking and backward-looking). Without 
perspective reflection (careful and conscious deliberation) as guidance for learning, 
our pursuit of knowledge will be puzzling and fragile. Without retrospective 
reflection (cautious and conscientious examination) as an inspector of learning, our 
acquisition of knowledge will be labor lost and go nowhere.  
 Learning without reflecting (with both directions), not only results in failure to 
improve, but may also lead to us making easily avoidable mistakes as well. However, 
Confucius also understands that we cannot simply reflect without new learning either. 
Without having inputs from learning, our reflection will become empty and 
eventually fade away. Without the kind of first-order knowledge in hand—what we 
learn from seeing, hearing, touching, practicing, or even reasoning—we will have no 
objects that we can reflect upon. While we learn, we learn our everyday knowledge, 
be it practical knowledge, craft knowledge, or knowledge about the external world. 
While we reflect upon what we have learned, we learn even more and know even 
better. As such, reflection can help us reach the highest grade of knowledge. 
 
4. CONFUCIAN CONTRIBUTION TO VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
I have been concerned here to show that not only is the Confucian thought of the 
Analects of epistemological significance, but that it can help us progress 
contemporary virtue epistemology. By focusing on reflection as a virtue, we can 
account for the possibility that reflection is ‘terribly unreliable’ in some cases, while 
defending the claim that in some cases, for agents with the requisite virtue, it is not. 
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In my discussion of Sosa's virtue epistemology, I have highlighted the central role that 
reflection plays in one of the leading theories of knowledge. While the place of 
reflection in Sosa's theory demonstrates the significance of reflection, the Confucian 
understanding of reflection is of importance as it tells us about the nature of this 
epistemologically significant element. This provides a basis for understanding an 
aspect, plausibly a central aspect, of the epistemically virtuous agent that has been 
under explored in the contemporary literature.16 Next I highlight a number of other 
areas in which Confucian thought can progress virtue epistemology.  
 Aside from helping us understand the nature of reflection as a virtue, Confucian 
thought on the reflection of the exemplary agent, together with the Confucian 
distinction between two different sorts of knowledge, helps us diagnose what goes 
wrong in the Fake Barn County case, and why, were there to be knowledge in such a 
case, it would be of a superior sort of knowledge.17 (Mi 2015, 366). Let's consider the 
Barney case, as described by Pritchard (2012, 251):18 
 
Using his reliable perceptual faculties, Barney non-inferentially forms a true belief that 
the object in front of him is a barn. Barney is indeed looking at a barn. Unbeknownst to 
Barney, however, he is in an epistemically unfriendly environment when it comes to 
making observations of this sort, since most objects that look like barns in these parts are 
in fact barn façades. 
 
For Sosa, Barney has animal knowledge and so is fully competent though he doesn't 
have the complete second-order competence necessary for the apt belief to be aptly 
grasped.19 By distinguishing animal knowledge (apt belief) from reflective knowledge 
(apt belief aptly noted as such) and explaining the Barney case as a case of animal 
knowledge, Sosa provides a position that goes some way to reconciling competing 
intuitions with regard to the case.20  
 While concurring with much of Sosa's position in this matter, we can identify the 
problem in the Barney case as a failure to manifest a competence of skillful reflection 
(some kind of metacognition). Certainly Barney is unfortunate. How could he have 
known that he was in such a situation? This, however, is beside the point – sometimes 
knowledge, especially reflective knowledge, is hard.21  That we deny that he has 
                                                
16 While there is a contribution to contemporary virtue epistemology from the Analects, of course what 
is said there requires careful interpretation and isn't elaborated upon the way positions in contemporary 
epistemology tend to be. So while we might like to know more about reflection on Confucian thought, 
what we have from the Analects on reflection is limited. Yet as evidenced from the quoted passages 
and the discussions of those passages, what we do have is intricate, plausible, and interesting thoughts 
on reflection that fit well with our pre-theoretical image of the epistemically virtuous agent.  
17 The Fake Barn County case appears in a paper by Goldman (1976), though the author credits Carl 
Ginet with the example.  
18 The original barn façade case first appeared in a paper by Alvin Goldman (1976). Goldman credits 
the example to Carl Ginet. 
19 This is owing to his situation. (Sosa 2012, 12).  
20 Greco (2010), by arguing that abilities are environment-relative, offers a different way for dealing 
with Barney-type cases. For criticism of this response, see Author B (2014).    
21 Exercising the relevant metacognition in a given situation does not imply engaging in a lengthy 
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reflective knowledge on the basis of his failure to manifest metacognition does not 
imply that we think that an agent has to exercise the same carefulness in every 
situation. Of course, when a situation doesn't call for such carefulness, there is no 
need to manifest such carefulness.22 Recall, the reflection of the exemplary agent 
aims both at goods and seeks to avoid bads. While Barney in Fake Barn County is, 
let's assume, aiming at truth when he forms his belief, a plausible interpretation of the 
case is that Barney does not exhibit the retrospective component of virtuous reflection, 
though this is precisely the sort of case when such retrospective reflection is required 
to avoid going wrong. If he were to engage his retrospective reflection, then we 
would at least expect him to be more cautious and sensitive in his belief. It's also the 
case, that were Barney or any agent to get something right because of competence in 
the face of a hostile epistemic environment, then that competence would likely 
involve a reflective capacity to overcome the misleading appearances that hostile 
epistemic environments typically involve. This indicates an epistemic contribution of 
virtuous reflection.    
 Confucian thought, this time in The Great Learning, has another contribution to 
make to epistemology.23 In this case, it most obviously does so in the area of social 
epistemology. While The Great Learning is concerned with reflection, it is also 
concerned with 'extended knowledge'. At the very beginning of The Great Learning, 
we learn what it is about: "The way of great learning consists in the manifestation of 
manifesting virtue, in reaching out to others, in achieving ultimate goods".  
 According to the text, when reflection and extended knowledge are appropriately 
developed, then final goods may be attained. More specifically, second-order virtue, 
of which virtuous reflection is an example, puts us in a position to work towards 
obtaining the best kind of epistemic goods. We should begin by trying to comprehend 
the world around us. This means taking in information or a subject matter in a way 
that is systematic. By doing so we are better positioned to weed out errors from our 
own mind and eventually reach understanding and wisdom—the best kind of 
epistemic goods. The other theme of The Great Learning regards 'extended 
knowledge' which concerns epistemic cooperation with others, and requires reflection 
and consensus. By establishing consensus a group has peace or harmony which 
allows it to persist as a social unit and facilitates learning cooperation within the 
group. This attention to the need for consensus within epistemic groups is an 
alternative to the common knowledge requirement for group knowledge. While we're 
not going to make the case for preferring consensus to common knowledge as such a 
requirement here, our point is to draw the reader's attention to the alternative we get 
                                                                                                                                      
process of reflection every time one forms a belief. As we have seen, reflection may lead to a 
metacognition that is immediate.  
22 We're not saying that Barney is blameworthy. The point is purely the epistemic point as to what 
would need to happen in order for Barney to have knowledge. He is not in an environment in which 
what look like barns are barns, rather he is in an environment in which lots of things that look like 
barns are actually barn façades. 
23 Aside from the Analects, The Great Learning, along with two other texts make up what are regarded 
as the canonical Confucian texts. (Mi and Ryan forthcoming). 
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from Confucian thought, which, even if ultimately rejected, can help develop the 
discourse on this topic. Now let's consider Jenny the Chicago visitor’s case for a 
further different, though related, point: 
 
Our protagonist, whom we will call “Jenny”, arrives at the train station in Chicago and, 
wishing to obtain directions to the Sears Tower, approaches the first adult passer-by that 
she sees. Suppose further that the person that she asks has first-hand knowledge of the 
area and gives her the directions that she requires. Intuitively, any true belief that Jenny 
forms on this basis would ordinarily be counted as knowledge. (Pritchard 2010, 40).24  
 
What is important about this case is that Jenny plausibly is required to exercise a 
relevant counterfactual sensitivity (Pritchard 2010). For example, were the delivery of 
the testimony to be relevantly strange, say it is delivered with suppressed sniggers, or 
the content strange, suppose the testifier were to say to her to take the next train back 
to New York, the agent would be appropriately responsive to such factors. Such a 
responsiveness could involve not believing the testifier. Such a response to the Jenny 
case is not unique but appears somewhat ad hoc in that we don't get such a diagnosis 
from virtue epistemologists in other cases. Let me diagnose this case by bringing the 
Confucian ideas: 
(1) On Sosa’s account, an cognitive agent is in the running for knowledge if her belief 
is formed competently, by some intellectual virtues, a particular sort of reliable 
process. The cognitive achievement of attaining knowledge is creditable to the 
agent because the achievement (arriving at the truth) manifests the agent’s 
abilities.  
(2) Our protagonist, whom we called “Jenny”, arrives at the train station in Chicago 
and, wishing to obtain directions to the Sears Tower, approaches the first adult 
passer-by that she sees. Suppose further that the person that she asks has first-
hand knowledge of the area and gives her the directions that she requires.  
(3) Intuitively, any true belief that Jenny forms on this basis would ordinarily be 
counted as knowledge (testimonial knowledge). However, it is also intuitive that 
we should give the credit to the testifier (the adult passer-by), since it is him that 
has first-hand knowledge of the area.  
(4) It seems to be right to think that Jenny’s true belief is of some credit to her as 
well. After all, having arrived in the city and not knowing where one of the city’s 
famous sights is, asking someone how to get to that sight is the right kind of thing 
to do; and it’s not as if she would ask a young child, she asks adult, and she didn't 
ask one who obviously looked like a tourist.  
(5) Furthermore, Jenny wouldn’t have just believed the testifier she asked no matter 
what that testifier said. Had the testifier given Jenny directions while say trying to 
suppress sniggers, then Jenny wouldn’t have believed him. As well as how the 
testimony is delivered, what testimony is delivered, or in other words the content 
of the testimony, may also influence Jenny’s judgment. If Jenny were told, upon 
                                                
24 This example is originally from Jennifer Lackey (2007, 352). She used the case to support her claim 
that we don't deserve credit for everything we know and challenge Greco's virtue epistemology.  
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asking how to get to the Sears tower, to take the next train back to New York, then 
she wouldn’t have believed the testifier. If all this is right then it seems correct to 
say that Jenny’s true belief is of credit to her as well.  
(6) Defenders of an extended cognition thesis already employ a requirement very 
much like the appropriate integration requirement. This requirement has 
sometimes been expressed as a coupling relationship. (Clark and Chalmers, 
1998). The requirement is that for extended cognition to take place, the 
organismic agent must be properly integrated with an object (or subject) beyond 
that organismic agent. Jenny in this case can be seen as exhibiting her extended 
cognition. 
(7) Extended knowledge requires not only extended cognition, but also social 
institution. Extended cognition in turn requires an appropriate coupling relation, 
and extended knowledge involving social institution requires epistemic 
consensus. One can't have an appropriate coupling relation and epistemic 
consensus without reflective knowledge.  
(8) In the Jenny case, the agent's belief is guided by reflective knowledge. Her first-
order testimonial beliefs have been guided by her reflective knowledge. More 
specifically, her belief about the location of the Sears Tower has been informed by 
her reflective knowledge about the reliability of testimonial knowledge in the sort 
of circumstances that she is in.  
(9) Jenny plausibly has an apt belief, her belief is accurate because it's adroit and so is 
apt. Jenny, given the description of the case, plausibly also qualifies as enjoying 
reflective knowledge (knowing full well). It's not as though she doesn't know why 
she believes as she does, she would presumably say something along the lines of 
she believes as she does because she knows testifiers are reliable about the 
location of famous landmarks in their city. 
 
  This paper has made the case, contrary to traditional readings of Confucius, that 
Confucian thought, Confucius in particular, is of epistemological significance. I 
provided an explanation as to why it's unsurprising that the epistemological 
significance of Confucian thought has previously been overlooked, while locating 
that significance in the contemporary epistemological literature. Each of these tasks 
were, in fact, complementary, with the epistemological significance of Confucian 
thought best being located within virtue epistemology, and the only recent re-
emergence of virtue theoretic approaches in epistemology helping us understand the 
overlooking of the epistemological significance of Confucian thought. Next I made 
the case that Confucian thought is not just of epistemological significance, but that it 
also can contribute to the development of the contemporary discourse. For this we 
focused on reflection on the significance of reflection in the contemporary debate and 
what we learn from Confucius about the nature of reflection in the Analects.  
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